In 2019, Italy became the first G7 country to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, shocking its allies and threatening deeper rifts between the country’s coalition government. Hoping to strengthen Sino-Italian economic relationships, then Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte signed a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese President in Rome, promising the return of Chinese artefacts in Italy, collaboration between media outlets, and joint effort in the spheres of science and technology. Yet soon in 2023, under Giorgia Meloni, Italy withdrew from the project. Long opposed to participation in the Belt and Road, Meloni commented that joining the BRI was a “huge mistake”.
Launched in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative involves a global network of infrastructure projects including ports, railways and energy systems. Hoping to build the “new silk road”, the BRI involves more than 150 countries across Asia, Africa and Europe. Since its launch, the initiative has already been the object of scrutiny and political polarisation. Narratives centred around debt traps, “yellow peril” rhetoric, and even allegations of a Chinese attempt at colonisation, have been circled amongst Western politicians, think tanks and the wider public.
Yet Italy’s withdrawal tells a larger story. Europe is not decisively confronting China’s Belt and Road Initiative but quietly retreating from it – without a coherent strategy to replace it.
On one hand, the BRI creates the potential of initiating new trade routes between Europe and Asia, as well as access to local investment and a boost for job markets. But concerns emerge rapidly when fears around strategic infrastructure, economic dependency and political leverage are raised.
China, although the EU’s second largest trading partner, has a complex market. Concerns around asymmetry and an imbalance of representation in the Chinese economy are issues that provoke debate amongst politicians. The EU sees business in China as something being increasingly politicised, and notes difficulties European businesses have in the Chinese market, believing this to be down to systematic discrimination. Meanwhile, Chinese companies look to expand influence across Europe; a potential threat to domestic supply chains. This, amongst human rights concerns and differences in political ideology, contributes to the difficult decision European leaders must make in face of their current situation where, whilst distance from China is preferred, economic collaboration is heavily leaned upon.
COSCO Shipping’s control over Piraeus Port in Greece is an example of concern around China’s growing influence. A “dragon head” for the BRI’s extension to Europe, Piraeus Port is Greece’s largest and located on the Saronic Gulf on the western coasts of the Aegean Sea. In 2024, it was the Europe’s fifth largest port by container traffic and handled 4.8 million TEUs, acting as a vital transhipment port for primarily Chinese goods, destined for Europe and the South Mediterranean. Unsurprisingly, given China’s 67% stake, control over Piraeus Port has raised questions amongst Western countries. Piraeus is a living demonstration of Europe’s foreign policy trade-offs. Strategic ports give China long-term influence over European logistics and trade, and allow it to take advantage of resources, creating concerns for the local environment and workers’ rights. Yet despite this, the Greek government continues to support the investment; arguing that it was the only viable offer during the height of the Greek financial crisis. Undeniably, COSCO has transformed Piraeus from a struggling minor port to a global trade hub, especially given that over 10,000 jobs have been created; showing Chinese investment as a double-edged sword, both economically beneficial and risky to national interests.
Divisions within Europe on China policy expose the political fault lines the BRI highlighted. The Belt and Road lies in Europe’s twilight zone, with Western European countries shifting away from physical infrastructure and instead towards financial and monetary connectivity, whilst East Europe continues to engage. The EU has yet to provide a common response to the BRI or a unified strategy and China exploits this division. Choosing investment in Greece during the height of the nation’s financial crisis, and its involvement with Eastern European states such as Hungary has been one of its key strategies for influence. Chinese company BYD are expected to scale up production in Hungary this year, posing a significant challenge to European carmakers, including the risk of exploiting tax breaks without meaningful technological transfer, whilst the Budapest-Belgrade Railway is a project costing over $4 billion, backed by China. On the other hand, France and Germany’s stances towards Beijing has always been firm. France consistently supports the European Commission’s trade defence instruments including anti-subsidy tools, public procurement restrictions, and the anti-coercion mechanism; whilst Germany has moved from engagement to caution, growing wary of foreign investment and analysing threat to its own industrial interests.
An attempt at countering China’s BRI influence, the Global Gateway initiative was launched in 2021. The Global Gateway aims to mobilise up to 300 billion euros by 2027, primarily for digital connectivity, energy and transport, with a focus on sustainability – yet in comparison to the Belt and Road, it has stark limitations. Slower funding, complex bureaucracy and less global visibility are amongst the factors that push developing countries towards the BRI; where investment is both faster and less conditional. The division within Europe and the Global Gateway’s limitations mean Europe risks stepping back from China’s projects without offering a convincing alternative, posing uncertainty to the future of intercontinental trade.
In a rapidly developing world where demand increases by the second, infrastructure has become a major tool of global influence. The Belt and Road reflects just how ports, railways and digital networks can shape decades of geopolitical relationships. Europe’s quiet retreat from China’s Belt and Road Initiative reflects a deeper problem: not Chinese expansion, but Europe’s lack of strategic direction in an era where infrastructure defines power.
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