The War in Amhara - what do we know about the latest conflict ravaging Ethiopia?

Image source - aboodi vesakaran

This article was originally published on Dec 10, 2024.

‍

As fighting escalates between government forces and militia in the Amhara region, we delve into how the conflict came about and the risks of further escalation.

‍

What’s happening?

As of November 2024, the Amhara region in northwestern Ethiopia is engulfed in a brutal civil conflict between the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and a group of ethnic Amhara militias, collectively known as Fano. Fano combatants view their fight as a legitimat struggle against government oppression and attacks on Amhara civilians by other ethnic militias. In contrast, the Ethiopian government, under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, regards Fano as an obstacle to the modernization of the nation’s security forces and a barrier to long-term peace.

‍

How did we get to this position?

Between 2020 and 2022, Federal Government forces fought a brutal protracted conflict against the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a powerful ethno-nationalist militia from the Tigray region in Northern Ethiopia. The conflict largely surrounded fears by Tigrayan political elites that the Tigrayan ethnic group, which makes up just 6% of Ethiopia's population, risked marginalisation under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's political centralisation agenda.

‍

Beyond its dire humanitarian toll, with as many as 600,000 fatalities and numerous well-documented war crimes, the Tigray War also saw a huge destabilisation of ethno-political alliances. During the war, Fano militias allied with Ethiopian federal forces against the TPLF, seeking to both reclaim disputed territory in western Tigray near the Amhara border and to prevent the further decentralisation of the Ethiopian state. However, this alliance began to unravel in May 2022, after the Government’s arrest of over 4,000 politicians, journalists and militia personnel in an effort to combat what it saw as the growing threat of Amhara nationalism. Tensions increased further in the following months, after federal forces were accused of turning a blind eye to the massacre of hundreds of Amhara in the neighbouring Oromia region, further fuelling distrust between Abiy’s Government and the Amhara people.

‍

Whilst the Tigray War officially ended with the signing of the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022, the peace agreement itself further exacerbated tensions between the Amhara region and Abiy’s Government. Thanks to the exclusion of Fano from the peace talks and the failure of the agreement to resolve the status of Tigrayan territories occupied by Amhara militias, many Amhara felt betrayed. After the Federal Government moved to integrate regional special forces into the ENDF in April 2023, these tensions erupted in the form of mass protests in the Amhara region. Helped in part by the Government’s brutal crackdown against any dissent, by August the Amhara resistance had morphed into a full-blown insurgency led by the Fano, who were able to heavily recruit from former Amhara special forces personnel. Thus began a conflict which has since seen at least 15,000 casualties, with federal forces responding to various Fano advances with brutal crackdowns.

‍

The Situation Today

After a new general offensive by Fano in July this year saw the militia capturing a number of strategic territories, their progress has since been slowed by a counter-offensive by the ENDF. This counter-offensive has resulted in a number of air attacks by government forces against Amhara civilians, including a drone strike on 5th November in West Gojjam which killed an estimated 43 people including 13 children. Recent months have also seen the Ethiopian Government arbitrarily arresting and detaining thousands of Amhara civilians in makeshift detention camps, with Amnesty International accusing the regime of systematically targeting judges and academics to stifle dissent.

‍

It remains to be seen whether the ENDF’s ominously named “final operation” against Fano forces will result in the Ethiopian Government making any significant territorial gains in Amhara or instead just intensify the conflict further. Information on precisely what territory is controlled by each party is difficult to obtain thanks to the Government denying journalists access into the Amhara region. Earlier this year, a senior Fano official declared that the group controlled approximately 80% of Amhara, with Fano’s strongholds mostly in rural areas. However this figure is difficult to verify.

‍

The route out and the threat of further violence

As of now, a clear route out of the conflict seems very distant. Whilst government forces may have made some territorial progress in the last month, the brutal tactics used by the ENDF could well strengthen Amhara sentiment against the ruling regime and further reduce the likelihood of a peaceful settlement. Earlier this month, the New Humanitarian reported that at least 30% of the Fano soldiers they spoke to had come from the ENDF or Amhara regional special forces, clearly demonstrating how successfully Fano has been able to portray itself as a legitimate defender of Amhara rights. With such strong local support and a reliance on guerilla warfare it thus seems unlikely that the Fano will be defeated militarily any time soon.

‍

At the same time, whilst there have been some reports of the Ethiopian Government engaging in secret peace talks with members of Fano, it seems unlikely that Abiy’s Government will be willing to accept the continued existence of armed ethnic militias in Amhara, due to the difficult precedent this could set in other regions. Whilst combating Fano in the Amhara region, the federal government has also been engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign against the Oromo Liberation Army in the Oromia region. Although the OLA does not have the widespread public support that the Fano militias enjoy in Amhara, any government concessions to Fano could embolden the group. Moreover, with wounds still raw between the Ethiopian Government and Tigrayan civilians following the Tigray War, the Ethiopian Government will be loath to strengthen ethno-nationalist sentiment in Tigray.

‍

Moreover, the risk of a wider regional conflict is ever present. At a time when Ethiopia stands at loggerheads with many of its East African neighbours, from Somalia to Egypt, the threat of a foreign power supporting Ethiopia’s ethno-nationalist militias against the Federal Government remains ever present. Many researchers have speculated that Eritrea, for example, which supported Fano militarily during the Tigray War, may find it beneficial to do so again in order to contain the power of their old enemy the TPLF. Likewise, following a controversial port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, which Somalia see as threatening their territorial integrity, Somali officials may likewise seek to encourage political instability in the country, in order to weaken the Ethiopian Government.

‍

As for now, the War in Amhara continues to show little sign of abating, with international human rights groups increasingly concerned about the indiscriminate use of force by the Ethiopian Government against Amhara civilians. The UN has recently considered suspending its food programme in the region, after the killing of 5 and kidnapping of 11 aid workers between January and June 2024. Thus, whilst the conflict may seem relatively small in comparison to some of the other conflicts that have rocked East Africa in recent years, the risk of a major humanitarian catastrophe is ever present.